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A Decision Analysis of Objectives for a Fores t  P e s t  Problem 
David E. Bell 
Abstract 
The forests  of Eastern Canada a r e  subject to periodic outbreaks 
of a pest which devastates the t r ees  causing major disruption to the 
logging industry. This paper gives details of a study to find a cr i ter ion 
by which management policy alternatives could be evaluated in  con- 
junction with a simulation model of the forest. It describes the manner 
in which the important decision factors,  or  attributes, were determined 
and how a value functioil and a utility function were assessed over these 
attributes, taking into account the long t ime horizon involved of 
50-100 years. 

The report  which follows descr ibes  an  attempt to  determine an.d 
quantify prefe~e;7ces for  a fores t  region in New Brunswick, Canada. The 
fores t  i s  subject zo outbreaks of a pest called the Spruce Budworm which 
d ~ e s  great  ciarnzge .to the t r e e s  and thus to the logging industry, a major 
part  of the economy of the province. DDT has been sprayed extensiveiy for 
the last  twenty yeazs so  that now if the spraying were  to  stop a widespread 
uutbreak would oc:cur. T ' l r  Ecology Projec t  a t  the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) were using a detailed s i m ~ l a t i o n  model 
of the forest  to examine possible s t rategies  for  handling the pest, s ee  
Holling -- e t  al. [5], the Methodology Project  contributing to the study by 
creating a ilymal-nic Programming Optimization Algorithm, Winkler [ l  I.]; 
and  t h ~  study o ~ t l i ~ e d  he re  s tar ted when I attended a meeting of the Ecology 
and Metlmdology Projec ts  tcgether with some experts f rom the Canadian 
Tores t ry  Commi.ssiorL. They were  trying to  establish an objective f,unction 
for the optimization n~odel. by fitting values c to  the l inear formula i 
c ( E g g  Density) ?- c2(b t re s s ) l  + c (Proportion of Old T r e e s )  1 3 
+ c (Proportion of New T r e e s )  . 4 (I). I )  
.'; was disturSed by. this process  for two reasons.  Firs t ly ,  they did not 
appear to have a very accurate  way of arr iving a t  the parameters ,  and 
secoxldly the on ly  coricorn of the experts  seemed to be the monetary gains 
and losses  to the logging industry -whereas I had always supposed that our 
Zcology a.nd Envi~omxea. t  Pro jec t  would a l so  be concerned with the protecti.sn 
of wildlife zarl scenery. So 1 began this study with two aims: 
i) to derive the parameters  c for  the optimization model by i 
diiferent nleaus as  a comparison, 
i i  t n  discover the t rue  preferences of the members  of the Ecology 
Projec-i- r sgarding t rade  -of$s between profits, wildlife and the 
cnvirenment. 
*~t ; .ess  i s  z r~ieaouye s f  the health of the t r ees  measured  by the amount of 
defoliation in ca r ren t  and previous years  caused by the budworm. 
This paper te l ls  of my Progress ,  spread over the next eighteen months, 
towards achieving these aims.  In performing the analysis,  inevitably many 
mistakes were made and i f  I were  to repeat this  on a s imilar  study, I would 
do a grea t  many things differently, however I have chosen to describe he re  
what actually happened ra ther  than to serve  up a neat exposition of decision 
analysis a t  i t s  best. It should be borne in mind that this study was not 
planned in  detail ahead, ra ther  it developed m o r e  on a week by week basis  
and was subject to constant interruptions including two six -month separations 
of analyst f r o m  decision maker .  
The benefits of presenting it like this,  I hope, a r e  that on the one hand 
a number of theoretical i ssues  a r e  ra i sed  to which some attention should be 
paid and on the other it might encourage potential analysts who ,may feel  
daunted by the imposing l i te ra ture  on decision analysis to give i t  a t r y  
themselves.  
The f i r s t  section of this  repor t  deals with the initial investigztion I 
made to check whether the coefficients of the l inear objective function were 
accurate  and recounts the way i n  which we attempted to resolve apparent 
discrepancies in  the preferences of the different Ecology group members  
by finding alternative se t s  of fores t  s ta t is t ics  which better enabled the 
ecologists to agree.  
The second section descr ibes  the way i n  which I attempted to a s s e s s  a 
value function for  the preferences of one of the ecologists over attributes 
which were important to him. The difficulties associated with coila,psing 
indicators over t ime i s  r a i sed  and discussed. 
Section three  represents  stage two of the whole analysis. In this a 
utility function i s  a s s e s s e d  for the same "decision m a k e r ' '  wlGch in- 
corporates  many of the complicating factors  which hindered the assessment  
of the value function such a s  interdependencies of preferences for outcomes 
in  different periods. 
Section four summarizes  the preference assumptions which were used 
in the assessment  of the utility function. Section five presents  a review of 
the whole procedure,  discussing some of the i s sues  raised and the pitfalls 
encountered . 
In order  to keep this paper to a reasonable length many of the 
concepts used f rom decision analysis such a s  value function, utility function 
and various independence assumptions a r e  described rather  cursori ly ,  
the reader  who is not well acquainted with these definitions should 
consult Raiffa [ l o ]  o r  Keeney and Raiffa [7].  
1. Pre l iminary  Analysis 
I began by asking five of the conference participants to  rank a 
l is t  of s ta tes  of the forest ,  exhibited in Figure 1, by preference and 
af ter  they had done this,  asked them to give a value 0-100 to each state 
indicating i t s  "worth. I '  They were to rank the l i s t  by taking any pair 
of fores t  s ta tes  (summarized by the five data points) and decide which 
state they would prefer  the fores t  to be in, assuming that f rom then on 
nature and man would be required to deal normally with it. The value 
they gave to each s tate  could be derived by any reasoning they wished 
save that the ordering of preferences and of values should be the same.  
I then used a s ta t is t ical  software package to  obtain regress ion  
coefficients, see  for  example [3] ,  for  the linear formula (0. 1) by 
using Egg Density, S t ress ,  Proportion of Old and Young T r e e s  a s  in-  
dependent variables and the value a s  the dependent variable, deriving 
one formula for each of the five participants. 
The formulas I derived f r o m  the rankings of the two Fores t ry  
Commission members  were very close to the parameters  c .  actually 
1 
obtained a t  the meeting (despite m y  misgivings) but those of the three 
Ecology Projec t  members  were quite different f rom the other two and 
f rom each other. 
I discussed with the Ecologists the reasons f o r  their  differences. 
The feeling emerged that the s ta tes  in Figure 1 were meaningless 
because the whole fores t  could not be composed uniformally. Indeed, 
i f  it were, a l l  the twenty-seven s tates  would be equally terr ible .  So I 
asked them whether they could describe a new state vector which would 
be meaningful. 
2 
-- 
The fores t  covers  about 15,000 square miles .  
Figure 1. Forest States .  
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1 . 1  Defining a Meaningful State Description 
P ro fes so r  Holling then devised a l i s t  of seven typical endemic 
conditions of a sub-forest  (Figure 2) together with their  appropriate 
vector state classification a s  in Figure 1. Then a new l i s t  was drawn 
up (Figure  3 )  where the  s tates  of the fores t  were  described by seven 
parameters  (summing to 1)  giving the proportion or  mix of the total  
fores t  in  each condition category. 
All four members  of the Ecology group were  then asked for  their  
4 
preference rankings of these twenty s tates .  In addition I calculated 
the ranking implied by the objective function f r o m  the stand model used 
in  the Dynamic Programming formulation which used the maximization 
of fores t  profits a s  the objective. This i s  labeled "Fores t  Industryt i  in 
Figure 4 which gives the correlation between the five rankings. The 
marked clifference between the ecologists and the "Forest  Industry" 
partly ref lects  the fact that the experts were  asked to  think only in 
t e r m s  of the immediate future whereas the members  of the Ecology 
group were  thinking of the long t e r m  implications of the various state.., 
However, there  were s t i l l  differences in preferences within the 
group. Those of Holiing and Clark were  essentially the same,  though 
they a r r ived  a t  their  ordering s in completely different ways. Holliag 
f i r s t  created seven functions v1(p1), v2(p2), . . . , v7(p7) which gave 
his subjective "value" to  having a proportion p. of the fo res t  i n  
3 1 
condition i. Hence he gave a value of 
to forest  s ta te  2 in F igure  3, and then used these values to  obtain his 
ranking. Clark fixed his sights on having about 5 -10% of fores t  in 
condition 4 (outbreak) and on keeping the predictability of the fores t  
high (by having the proportions in conditions 3 and 7 low). He was 
aiming for a manageable forest .  
:;< 
The Canadian F o r e s t r y  Commission experts  had returned to Cailada. 
' ~ o t e  that he has thus made some assumption of independence between 
the parameters .  F o r  a discussion on this  topic see Section 3. 5 in [7]. 
Figure  2. C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  a f  P o s s i b l e  S tand  Cond i t ions .  
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Figure 3. Types Of F o r e s t  Mixes. 
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Figure  4 .  Corre la t ion  Matr ix.  
This led to a general discussion of what was desirable.  P r e  - 
4 dictability seemed to be one preference. Another was a des i r e  to 
take the observed his tor ical  budworm outbreaks over t ime (a cycle of 
the fores t  moving through conditions 1-6 sequentially) into the s a m e  
pattern over space that is, have the,  same proportion of the fores t  i n  
each condition a t  any given time: "Controlled Outbreaks. ' I  
It was decided that the seven s tat is t ics  used were not sufficient 
to descr ibe the s tate  of the forest  and Holling se t  to  work to  come up 
with a m o r e  comprehensive l is t  of indicators. The a im was to devise 
a sys tem whereby we could place a decision maker  i n  a chair where h e  
could wave a magic wand and place the fo res t  in condition A o r  condition 
B, where A and B were described by a se t  of summary  statist ics.  
Which s tat is t ics  would he like to  see  to enable him to  make a decision? 
If he  were  a logger he would want to know the amount of wood in 
good condition for  logging and the fores t ' s  potential for the next few 
yea r s  indicated by the level of budworm and so  on. 
F o r  any given decision maker  we would like to  build up a se t  of 
s ta t is t ics  (indicators) which te l ls  him a l l  (or  virtually al l )  that he wants 
to know in  o rde r  to choose between A and B f rom his point of view. 
To put this into practice one member of the group, Bill Clark, 
who is well acquainted with the problems of the a r e a  was appointed a s  a 
decision maker.  After Holling had drawn up a long l i s t  of possible 
indicators we three  had a meeting to discuss  this  list with Clark. Which 
ones was he interested in?  
We then r a n  into a problem. When a decision maker  evaluates 
the s tate  that the fores t  i s  in  now, he has  to  look to the future. He h a s  
to  predict  how the fores t  will behave, keeping in mind the present 
number of budworm, for  example. Hence when he evaluates the fores t  
condition he amalgamates in  his  mind how the fores t  w i l l  develop in  the 
future. Now the way i n  which the fores t  develops depends on the method 
of treatment,  that i s ,  on the policies being used for  logging, spraying 
and the like. 
4~ received a new perspective to  the problem when I asked Holling why 
he ranked F o r e s t  Mix Number 20 in F igure  3 last .  "Worst thing that 
could possibly happen, ' I  he said. 
Now reca l l  that we a r e  looking for an objective function which we 
can optimize to find a best policy for treating the forest.  But if the 
decision maker had known of this "best policy" he might have evaluated 
the fores ts  differently, which changes the best policy. Right? As an 
example suppose that a simple device i s  discovered which removes a l l  
possibility of a budworm outbreak. The forest  preferences of the 
decision maker will be altered. Although the result  of the optimization 
procedure may not be a s  good a s  this "device" i t  nevertheless may 
change his preferences.  What i s  needed i s  a set  of statistics such that 
preferences for their values a r e  independent of the policy being used. 
This was achieved by letting the decision maker  view a s t r ezm of 
statistics about the conditions of the forest  over a sufficiently long t ime 
horizon. Hence the decision maker  need not predict anything. He i s  
to  evaluate the s t r e a m  of statistics a s  one single finished product and 
is not to worry  about how likely they a r e  or  to wonder what policy 
achieved them. Then it i s  the job of the simulator to acljust i t s  internal 
policies to maximize the value assigned by the decision maker .  
Note then that now the type of statistics required has  changed. It 
i s  not necessary  to know the density of budworm a t  any given time; 
that was only needed to get an idea about the future state of the t rees .  
Since we can also see the quantity of lumber obtained for the next 100 
years  and the amount spent on spraying, i t  is i r relevant  to  know how 
much budworm is present. (Indeed, i t  i s  probably i rrelevant  to know 
how much was spent on spraying- -a simple net profit o r  l o s ~  may be 
sufficient. ) 
1. 2 Finding the Attributes Relevant to our Decision Maker 
Clark went through Holling's l i s t  of indicators deleting, adding 
and modifying. Some were discarded fo r  being too minor,  that i s ,  not 
likely to influence his decisions, others  because their implications were 
too.difficult to understand (particularly standard deviations or? data over 
space). The following l i s t  emerged of statistics for each year which 
Clark felt would affect h is  decisions. 
Financia l  
X1 = Pr o f i t  of logging indus t ry  
X 2  = Cost of logging 
X j  = Cost of spraying 
Logging Potent ia l  of F o r e s t  
X4 = Amount of ha rves tab le  wood 
X5 = P e r c e n t  of X4 actual ly  ha rve s t ed  i n  the  given yea r  
F o r e s t  Composit ion 
X6 = Divers i ty ,  a m e a s u r e  of the  mix tu r e  of differing c l a s s e s ,  
a g e  type of t r e e s  fo r  r e c r ea t i ona l  purposes .  The  higher 
the d ivers i ty  t he  be t t e r  
X7  = Pe r c e n t a g e  of old t r e e s  
Observable  Damage 
X8 = Pe r c e n t a g e  of defoliated t r e e s  
X = Pe r c e n t a g e  of dead  t r e e s  9 
10 = Pe r c e n t a g e  of logged a r e a s  (no t r e e s ,  s tumps ,  etc.  ) 
Social  
X l l  = Unemployment (measu red  by taking a c e r t a i n  logging l eve l  
a s  ful l  mill capacity)  
Insecticide 
X12 = Average  dosage p e r  sp rayed  plot .  
In  addit ion to  the  list above,  a va r iance  fo r  t he se  s t a t i s t i c s  taken ove r  
the  265 s t a t e s  was  a l so  included in  some  ca se s .  
Ignoring the variances for a moment this sti l l  leaves 12 x T 
statistics for a history cf T periods. Indeed, eight of these statistics 
were originally intended for each site which would have given 
(4 t 265 x 8)T  stat is t ics .  
Two fifty-year his tor ies  were generated by the simulation model 
with an initial se t  of internal policies and these statistics generated. 
Clark studied these listings and, following his ear l ie r  procedure for  
ordering the listing 03 Figure 3 ,  essentially Picked a few key statistics 
which he desired to maintain at  a cer tain level and then checked to see 
that the others  were  not seriously out of line. 
The idea a t  this stage was to give him a sequence of twelve o r  so 
such fifty-year listillge sf s tat is t ics  and ask  him to order  them. Then 
he wolrld be given the complete simulation outputs and asked to rank 
those; then the two l is ts  wou.ld be compz.red. In this way the l i s t  of 
s tat is t ics  would be modified and he would l ea rn  better what were their 
implications, so that eventually he would be able to a r r ive  a t  the same 
orderings for the complete listings and the reduced set of' statistic 
listings . 
Owing to the mechanical difficulty of keeping IIASA's computer 
in  operation and lack of t ime this was not done. For  the sake of outlining 
the full procedure, let us assurrie that this was done. 
We then set about the remaining l i s t  of statistics ( X I  to X12) 
to reduce it to a size of a t  most  five or  six per year.  
I successfully ai-gued that since the potentia!ly harvestable wood, 
potentially harve  stable wood harvested, cost of spraying and insecticide 
w4,  Xg' X,3 P X12) were given over a l l  periods,  if these four attributes 
were going ser ioasly wrong it would show up eventually somewhere else.  
The cost of logging could be deduced approximately fro-m the profit 
figure and the unemployment level (which i s  proporti.onal to  wood h a r -  
vested). 
This left Pro.fit, Diver sit)-, Old Trees ,  Defoliation, Dead Trees ,  
Logging Effects and Unemployment. It seems clear  that a l l  but the f i r s t  
and las t  a r e  reiatcd to recreational,  visual and environmental con- 
siderations. Could not these five statistics be amalgamated into a 
single statistit:: oi recrea t ion?  Then we would have: 
DEFOLIATION GGING OLD TRv DIVERSITY 
DAMAGE STAND COMPOSITION 
\/' \ 
VlSUA L 
RAT IN G 
RECREATIONAL 
POTENTIAL 
REC REATIONAL VALUE 
Figure 5. 
P = Profit  
U = Unemployment 
R = Recreational Value of F o r e s t  
a s  attributes for each time period. 
The general plan used by Clark for producinga recreational 
index i s  shown in Figure 5. 
The recreational potential is a value assigned by the Canadian 
Fores t ry  Commission to each region of the forest ,  indicating i t s  
accessibility to touris ts  and quality of surroundings (s t reams,  lakes, 
gorges). Each region has a value 0, 30, 70, o r  100. 
For  all the attributes in Figure 5 Clark divided the possible range 
into three classifications, for example, for defoliation a stand with 
0- 15% defoliation was good, 15-45% medium, 45- 100% bad. Then where 
two attributes were combined in Figure 5 he used the rule displayed in 
Figure 6. 
Figure 6. 
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Hence a stand would be given a visual rating equal to the worst  rating of 
i t s  components. The final composition of recreational potential and 
visual rating was achieved by Figure 7. 
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Because some of the  regions of the  fo re s t  a r e  not suitable for  r e -  
creat ion even under the  best of conditions, the following a r e  the number  
of regions possible in each recrea t ion  category. 
0 s GOOD 38 
0 s MEDIUM s 262 
3 5 BAD s 2 6 5  . 
Since the tota l  number of regions i s  fixed (265) i t  i s  only neces sa ry  to 
specify two of t he  above classifications;  hence the final l i s t  of s ta t i s t i cs  
to be tabulated for  each period i s :  
P = Prof i t  
U = Unemployment 
G = Number of Good Recreational Regions 
B = Number of Bad Recreat ional  Regions. 
2. A s s e s  sinp a Value Function 
The a i m  now i s  t o  der ive a formula which takes  the  s ta t is t ics  
(Pt ,  Ut,  Gt , Bt) t = 0, 1, 2 . . . , and produces a value V such that  if 
f o r e s t  his tory a is prefer red  to  fo re s t  his tory P then 
Over recent  yea r s  a grea t  deal  of r e s e a r c h  h a s  gone into devising good 
techniques for the a s se s smen t  of value functions [7, l o ] .  These 
techniques were  not t r i ed  on this  problem. At the t ime  of the  study the  
methodology group at  IIASA was experimenting with l inear  programming 
(L. P. ) software and was eager  for examples  with which to work. I 
combined our two a i m s  and used the following l inear programming 
approach to  find value functions. 
Consider a value function V having two var iables  x ,  y. Suppose 
the decision maker  has  said that  in  the following pa i r s  the  f i r s t  one in  
each i s  p re fe r red  by h im to  the second: 
Thus 
V(3, -7) - V( 1, 1) > 0 
and 
V(0, 2) - V(-1, 2) > 0 , 
Suppose we approximate V with a quadratic polynomial 
2 2 .  V(a, y) = ax t by + cxy + dx + ey , 
then we have that 
a r e  necessary requirements  for V to be a valid function. Examples of 
polynomial expressions whose coefficients satisfy (2. 2) a re :  
By obtaining more  pairs  of preference orderings,  the se t  of possible 
coefficient values (a,  b, c ,  d, e )  may be reduced, for example, i f  we 
now find that in addition 
then only the f i r s t  of the three  examples above i s  sti l l  valid. 
If there  a r e  many alternative value functions for a given data se t  
an L. P. algorithm will a rb i t ra r i ly  choose one of them unless i t  i s  given 
some selection criterion. Supplying an objective function for the L. P. 
problem gives the advantage that with the same  data se t  the L. P. will 
always choose the same value function; hence a s  the data set a l t e r s  
slightly (because of new orderings) i t  i s  eas ier  to see  i t s  effect on the 
resulting value function. 
Note that if (a ,  b, c,  d, e )  i s  a solution of ( 2 .  2) then so i s  any 
positive multiple of it; hence the arb i t ra ry  constraint 
was added to bound the problem. 5 
The objective cr i ter ion used was to maximize the minimum gap 
between preference rankings. In the exzmple used above the gaps 
between the left hand side of (2. 1) and the right hand side (zero)  using 
V1 a r e  35, 26, 2; for  V2 a r e  24, 51, 1; and for  V3 a r e  30, 40, 1. 
Hence the minimum gap in  each i s  2, 1, 1, and so the maximum 
minimum gap i s  2 and V would be the prefer red  polynomial f rom 1 
that list. 
In general,  for a, l is t  of preferences 
(> reads  "is prefer red  to1 ' )  
the full l inear program would be 
s a; = Max s 
Note that a valid function exists if and only if s* > 0 .  If s': 0 the 
decision maker  would be questioned inor e closely on doubtfl.11 orderings,  
o r  if he i s  resolute,  a higher order  approxima,tion should be taken. 
Returning to our study, with four attributes (P, U, G, B) per 
t ime period two qualitative assumptions were made by Clark (with my 
prompting) that were  felt to be reasonable (in the f i r s t  case)  o r  
necessary  (in the second). 
5 ( a 1  means t a  if a > 0, -a  if a < 0 .  
a )  Preferences for profit and unemployment were ' tindependent" 
f rom those of recreation. That i s ,  the relative orderings of 
(P, U) pairs were independent of the level of the recreation so 
6 long a s  it  was the same in each case. The reverse was also 
felt to be true, that preferences for recreational alternatives 
were independent of profit/unemployment levels so long a s  these 
remained constant. 
b) Clark's preferences for profit and unemployment levels in a 
year depended on what those levels were last year and would be 
next year. For example, a drop in profits to gain fuller employ- 
ment i s  not too serious i f  compensatingly larger profits a r e  made 
in the surrounding years. Also, an unemployment level of 10% 
i s  worse i f  i t  follows a year of full employment than i f  it follows a 
year of 10% unemployment; that i s ,  he prefers a steady level to 
one which oscillates. 
Clark felt that i f  we replaced P a s  a statistic by t 
we might better justify a separable value function such a s  
where Vt i s  a value function based on the figures for year t 
alone. 
These assumptions enabled us to work with a value function 
allowing us to calculate a value function for recreation independently of 
that for profit and unemployment. 
Figure 8 shows the rankings given by Clark for the two value 
functions X, Y for any time period. Note that for (Q, U) i t  i s  an 
'preferential Independence, see Chapter 6 of [7]. 
o r d e r e d  l i s t  and t h e  r ank ings  f o r  r e c r e a t i o n  include s o m e  equal i t ies .  
The  l a s t  t h r e e  i n  the  r e c r e a t i o n  list w e r e  added when I d i scovered  tha t  
t h e  f i r  st polynomial  e x p r e s s i o n  w a s  not  su i tably  monotonic f o r  e x t r e m e  
value s .  
T h e s e  rank ings  p roduce  t h e  folLowing value funct ions ,  a quadra t i c  
and a cubic  polynomial  approximat ion  being used  respec t ive ly .  
and 
2 2 Y = (71.8 - 1.88G)G - B (5.88 t .00134B) + GB(19.63 - 0 . 5 9 7 G t  0.185B) 
F i g u r e  8 
Then C l a r k  gave  the  following o r d e r i n g s  f o r  s e t s  of a l l  f o u r  
a t t r i b u t e s  ( F i g u r e  9 ) .  The  g r o u p s  a r e  1j.sts with e a c h  m e m b e r  of 
a g roup  being p r e f e r r e d  t o  the  one  below it. 
5, 4, I69 50 
5, 7, 16, 3 0 
5, 0, 16, 100 
5, l o ,  16, o 
0, l o ,  16, o 
F i g u r e  9. 
With the  a id  of the  functions X, Y t h e s e  l i s t s  m a y  be reduced t o  
lists of two a t t r ibu tes ;  f o r  example  t h e  f i r s t  list becomes:  
T he  cubic approximat ion technique w a s  used again  t o  find a combined 
value function of 
L 
- 9 , 0 5 3 ~  - 3 , 0 3 9 , 5 0 0 ~  - 1 9 5 , 1 9 7 ~  
2. 1 The Time Problem 
So fa r  the analysis has  reduced the simulated his tory of the fores t  
into a t ime s t r e a m  of values, one per year. F o r  two simulated 
his tor ies  with output values 
and 
it i s  reasonable to suppose that the decision maker  p re fe r s  the f i r s t  
1 2 his tory to the second if V 2 Vk f o r  a l l  k and if this  ineqoality i s  
7 k 
s t r i c t  for some k. 
But it i s  not possible a t  this stage for  the  analyst to say whether 
Clark would prefer  a five year his tory 
to one of 
(2, 3, -1, 4,  8 )  
because we have no ru les  for  intertemporal trade-offs. The onljr 
manageable model for  such t rade-offs  i s  a linear assumption that 
v = a t V(Qt, U,, Gt, Bt) 
for some coefficients a where presulmabljr a r a 2 0 for  a l l  t. t '  t t t l  
I Even this dominance argument i s  ooly valid because we a r e  assuming 
that t he re  a r e  no interperiod dependencies of preferences.  For  example 
we could imagine that the 5 year s t r eam 
( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,  5) 
would be prefer red  to 
(10 ,9 ,8 ,  7, 6 )  
if the decision maker  abhorred a drop f r o m  one period to the next. 
8 Had time permitted we could have found viable values for the 
coefficients a by using the same technique which led to the coefficients t 
in  the second value function 
However, a t  that stage we agreed that the simulation model 
should generate different histories using a variety of policies and 
calculate the value 
for a range of constants a, 0 < a < 1 .  
3. The Assessment of a Utilitv Function 
Even i f  we ignore the crude manner in  which the time s t reams of 
the attributes were evaluated there remains another important element 
in the effective evaluation of policies by use of an objective function. 
The particular history generated by the simulator depends upon the 
initial condition of the forest,  the many complex equations governing 
the growth of budworm, t r ees ,  the effects of predators and other factors,  
but a l l  of these a r e  deterministic only if the weather pattern i s  known. 
Different weather patterns will produce different histories and hence a 
policy cannot be judged purely on the resul ts  of one run, i t s  effects 
must be considered under a l l  types of weather futures. Fortunately, 
this problem may be overcome if a utility function i s  used rather  than 
a value function. A utility function not only has  the properties of a 
value function, but in situations in which outcomes a r e  uncertain, i t s  
expected value provides a valid quantity for making rankings. 
That i s ,  if u(P, W) represents  the utility (or value) of the forest 
history which resul ts  f r o m using policy P when weather history W 
occurs and f(W) i s  the probability that weather pattern W does occur 
then 
u p ,  W) f (W)  = V ( P )  
where the sum i s  taken over al l  possible weather patterns, i s  a legitimate 
value function over policies Po 
 ill Clark returned to Canada in July 1974. 
Assessment  procedures for utility functions a r e  s imilar  to those 
for value functions except that in  addition, the decision m a k e r ' s  
attitude towards r i sk  taking must be incorporated. As with value 
functions i t  i s  useful to recognize assumptions that will break down 
the assessment  of one function with many attributes into one of assessing 
severa l  utility functions each having a t  most  one or two attributes. 
One such assumption i s  utility independence. For  a utility function 
u(x, y), where x and y might be vectors of attributes,  if the decision 
maker ' s  attitude towards r i sk  taking in situations where only the outcome 
of x i s  uncertain but y i s  fixed and known, i s  independent of what that 
fixed value of y i s ,  then attributes X a r e  said to be utility independent 
of Y. It i s  important to real ize that X may be utility independent of 
Y even if X and Y involve factors  which in other respects  a r e  closely 
related. For  more  information and examples see Chapter 5 of Keeney 
and Raiffa [7]. The functional statement of this property is that fo r  any 
1 2 two values of Y, y and y say, 
for some constants a and b, where b must be positive. 
In our problem which has four attributes per year,  with a horizon 
of T periods (T  will be in the range 50-200) we require  a utility function 
of 4T attributes so that some extensive assumptions will be required. 
Meyer [9] for  example has shown that for  a utility function u(xl,  x2, . . . , xT) 
if each subset of attributes [X 1, . . . , Xt] is considered to be utility 
independent of [Xt+ l ,  . . . , XT] and vice versa,  then the utility function 
has either an additive f o r m  
for some positive constants a or a multiplicative fo rm 
t 
for some constants b and c where in each case u (x ) i s  a utility 
t t '  t t  
function over X alone. t 
These  f o r m s  were inappropriate for our case  principally because 
C la rk ' s  attitude towards r i s k  taking for levels of unemployment in one 
period depended on the levels  of unemployment in the  year before, and 
the  year a f t e r ,  and hence Meyer ' s  assumptions of utility independence 
did not apply. 
Not only that but Clark  wished to  make  an  assumption of stationarity 
( s ee  Koo9mans [8 ] )  that  i s ,  he  wished to t r e a t  a l l  y e a r s  equally, both with 
r ega rd  to  value order ings  and in  r i s k  taking. This meant that  the 
coefficients a t 7  bt' C t  and the functions u would a l l  be independent of t 
their  suffix t implying that  all. t ime  s t r e a m s  which were  mere ly  p e r -  
mutations of one another would be assigned equal utility, which was not 
the case.  F o r  example,  dealing only with levels  of employment he 
p re fe r r ed  the s t r e a m  (100, 100, 90, 90, 100) to  (100, 90, 100, 90, 100) 
because of the reduced variance between years .  9 
F ishburn  [4] used assumptions called Markovian dependence to 
produce a f o r m  
where  u (x , x ) i s  a utility function over the two at t r ibutes  x x t  t  t t l  t' t t  1 ' 
Whilst th is  does allow for some interdependency between at t r ibutes  in 
neighbouring periods C la rk  was quite f i r m  in prefe r r ing  the lot tery 
to that of 
9 ~ e  switched f r o m  talking in t e r m s  of unemployment to  employment s o  
tnat the  symbol u woald not be csed simultaneously for utility and a 
level of unemployment. E = 100 - U i s  the new attr ibute.  
t  t 
where the figures a r e  percentage of employment in 5 successive years .  
For  (3. 3) to be valid for Clark ' s  preferences he should have been 
indifferent between the two lotreries.  
3. 1 Finding Appropriate Assumptions 
To find a functional f o r m  that would be acceptable to him I con- 
sider ed a s s umptions involving conditional utility independence. This 
condition says,  in essence,  that if the set  of attributes i s  divided into 
three par t s  X, Y and Z then X i s  conditionally utility independent 
of Y i f  whenever Z i s  fixed a t  some level and we regard  the problem 
a s  now only having two attributes X and Y then X i s  utility indepen- 
dent of Y and that this  i s  t rue  for a l l  fixed values of Z. F o r  m o r e  
detailed expositions of this  concept see  Chapter 6,  Keeney and Raiffa [7] 
o r  Bell [2]. 
The idea was to  assume that each subset [xl, .  . . , X t - l }  was 
conditionally utility independent of {xtt 
. . . , XT] and vice versa.  
This i s  quite s imi lar  to  the assumptions used by Meyer to obtain (3. 1)  
and (3. 2) but does not make any assumption of independence of pre-  
ferences for X on either Xt-l  t o r  X t t l  ' 
These assumptions led (for T 2-4) to the resul t  that either 
where X i s  a constant and 
0 0 0 0 0 
ut(xt,xtt = u(xl ,  x2, . . , X t -  1, Xt,Xtf  1'Xtt2, . . , xT)  
where xo i s  any fixed value of X, ,  so that for  example 
0 l 0 1' 
Ut(:t7 X t t  1?= Ut+ 1 ixtt 1 ' Xtt2) '  and where u was scaled so that 
u u 
u (x l , .  . . , x T )  = 0. For  a proof of this resul t  see Bell [2] . 
Note that (3 .4)  i s  exactly (3. 3) but that (3. 5)  not only allows 
interperiod dependencies but also i s  able to differentiate between the 
lotteries L1 and L2 . 
Bill Clark returned to UASA for the summer  of 1975 and I 
quizzed him on the appropriateness of the assumptions which led to 
(3.5). He agreed that they seemed appropriate and so we proceeded to 
a s s e s s  his  utility function over the attributes [Pt, Et, G , B ), t = 1, . . . , T. t t  
Questioning soon established that his preferences for the recreation 
time s t r eams  ( G I ,  B1, G2, BE, .  . . ,%,BT] were mutually utility inde- 
pendent with those of profit and employment { P 1 , E I ,  P 2 , E 2 , .  . . , P T , E T ) ,  
enabling us to use the formula ( see  Keeney [ 6 ] )  
where uR i s  a utility function for recreation and u a social utility S 
function, kl and k2 being constants, k la ter  being identified a s  zero. 2 
I should emphasize that Clark was not one to make assunlptions out of 
expediency, whenever he agreed that an  assumption was valid, we had 
discussed the implications a t  length and verified that his preferences 
reflected the required pattern o r  were sufficiently close. 
3. 2 The Utility Function for  Recreation 
F o r  the recreat ion s t reams,  he felt that the assumptions of Meyer 
were appropriate and in  addition that in any given time period G and T 
BT were mutually utility independent. To determine whether the 
additive fo rm (3. 1)  or multiplicative fo rm (3. 2) was the appropriate one 
to use I asked him if he had any preference between the following two 
lot ter ies  
where G1 and G2 a r e  the number of good recreational a r e a s  in two 
successive years  and B1 and B2 a r e  in a l l  outcomes assumed to 
be fixed. lo If the additive form (3. 1) was to be appropriate he should 
have been indifferent between the two but in fact he preferred the second 
lottery on the grounds that he was very averse  to  having two very bad 
yea r s  together. This meant that the form of the recreational utility 
function was 
where the various constants a r e  independent of the t ime subscript 
because of the assumption of stationarity. 
The marginal utility functions u and u for the number of G B 
good and bad a r e a s  were assessed  in  the usual manner ( see  for example 
* 
Raiffa [ lo])  by asking questions of the form "what value G = g for 
cer tain do you feel i s  equally preferable to a 50-50 gamble between G = 20 
and G = 5?11 
Thus u (g) was assessed  a s  in Figure 10 which was fitted quite G 
closely by the exponential curve uG(g) = 1 - exp(-0. 08g): The function 
u (b)  was slightly more  complicated (Figure 11) being fitted in  two B 
pieces by. 
u (b) = -0. 3 + 0. 35(+1.463 + 28. 222 exp(-0. 0164b)) B 
The constants k l ,  k2, k3, k4 were calculated by fixing 
kl f k2uG(40) + k3uB(o) + k4uG(40h-lB(0) = 
and 
and then using indifferent pairs  given by Clark 
loRecall  that because G and Bt a r e  mutually utility independent it i s  
not necessa ry  to speciry a t  what level B1 and B2 a r e  fiued. 
Figure 10. Utility Function for the Number 
of Good Recreational Areas. 
Figure 1 1 .  Utility Function for the Number 
of Bad Recreational Areas. 
to f o r m  three  more  equations in the k i l s  Taking a l l  the combinations 
of two pairs  f rom (3. 9 )  together with (3. 8) provided three  solutions for  
the k ' s  which a r e  exhibited i n  Figure 12. 
Figure 12 
The pair l t 3  seemed to be the least  reliable of the three  since it in- 
volves two pai rs  that a r e  quite similar.  Also since Clark always pre-  
f e r s  to increase the number of good a r e a s  i f  possible, the constraint 
Pa i r  
l t 2  
2 t 3  
l t 3  
should be t rue  for a l l  b, and fo r  s imilar  reasons also 
k2 
-. 60 
-. 57 
- .45  
1 
-. 48 
-. 55 
-. 71 
although since k3 and k4 a r e  positive this  i s  not important. The 
smallest  value of u (b) is 0. 32 and hence the coefficients should be B 
chosen so that 
which none of the solutions in  Figure 12 satisfy. However extrapolating 
the f i r s t  two se t s  of coefficients until (3. 10) was satisfied gave 
coefficients of 
k3 
. 15 
. 1 7  
.22  
and the implied utility function using these coefficients made a l l  of the 
equivalences in (3. 9 )  hold almost exactly! 
k4 
1.42 
1.37 
1 .23  
To finalize the recreational utility function now only required 
the knowledge of a and Q in  (3. 7).  
F o r  this I asked him to consider a t ime s t r e a m  in which a l l  values 
after year 2 a r e  assumed fixed and that the number of bad a r e a s  i s  
fixed a t  100 for years  1 and 2. So, considering only vectors of the 
type (number of good a r e a s  in year 1, number of good a r e a s  in year 2) 
he was to give values g l ,  g2, g3, g49 g5 such that 
His answers were 9, 10, 12, 14 and 15 respectively. In attempting to 
solve (3. 7) with this  information it became clear  that in fact the 
additive form (3. 1)  rather  than the multiplicative f i ts  (3. 12). Referring 
this  apparent inconsistency back to Clark we established that his  p re -  
ference between the lot ter ies  L and L4 was caused by the ra ther  3 
ext reme nature of the consequence in L of two successive years  with 3 
ze ro  good recreational a reas .  When I replaced the zeros  in L3 and 
L4 with something positive he became indifferent. Perhaps  this should 
indicate a singularity in  the function u a t  G = 0 but I chose to  ignore G 
this. 
Thus the recreat ional  utility function was established a s  
3. 3 - The Social Utility Function 
Clark having accepted the conditional utility independence 
assumptions necessary  to validify the use of equation (3. 5)  we chose 
0 0 fixed levels of p = 0 million dol lars  per  year and e = 100 percent t t 
employment. The main task  was thus to a s s e s s ,  for  each 
t = 1 2, . . . , T - 1 , the function 
o r  in a shorthand notation where we omit explicit reference of attributes 
a t  their  fixed values, uS(pt, et, ptC1, et+l).  Whilst previous assumptions 
about independence between attributes had either appeared f rom 
questioning or  had been prompted by me, on this occasion Clark 
volunteered the information that when considering his  preferences for 
employment in  a given year ,  he  was only concerned with the levels of 
profit in the same  year and the levels of employment in  the previous and 
la ter  year ,  and that his  preferences for  profit in  a given year depended 
only upon the level of employment in that year.  This implied that for 
the attributes Pt,Et, q+l, Et+l we could a s s e r t  that 7 was mutually 
conditionally utility independent with P and Et+l and s imilar ly that t+ 1 
%+ was mutually conditionally utility independent (m. c. u. i. ) with P t 
and Et. This set  of additional assumptions proved to be most  useful. 
Consider the assumptions leading to (3.4) and (3. 5) for T = 4. In 
full they a r e  
and 
(x1,x2] m.c .u . i .  X4 
Those that Clark had proposed were I 
and 
showing that (3 .4)  o r  (3. 5) was appropriate for the res t r ic ted  function 
us(pt, et '  Pt+ ' et+ l ) .  
It i s  easy to show ( se t  a l l  attr ibutes a t  their  fixed level except for  p2) 
that the assumption of stationarity forces  uS(pt, et, pt+ l ,  e t+ ) and 
the full function uS(p, e )  either both to  be additive or  both to be 
- 
multiplicative and i f  multiplicative to have the same parameter  X. The 
non indifference between lotteries L1 and L2 showed the multiplicative 
f o r m  to be the appropriate one. Hence using a l l  the declared independence 
assumptions,  the social  utility function could be expressed a s  
T T-1  
for some constant A ,  where u A and u% a r e  each two attribute utility 0 
A t '  t t, e t t l )  = u (eo e ). Thus the functions for which u ( p  e ) = u (e  B t-1' t 
assessmentprob lemres tedonf ind ing  u u and A .  A' B 
3. 3. 1 The I n t e r ~ e r i o d  E m ~ l o v m e n t  Function 
We began with u Recall  that uB(et, et+ ) i s ,  in effect, 
0 0 0 B' 0 0 
uS(2 , e l 7 .  . , et  - l ,  et, et+ l ,  ett2, . . . , e T )  SO that when questioned about 
his preferences he was to compare employment s t r e a m s  of the form 
(100, 100, . . . , 100, et, ett l ,  100,.  . . , 100). I proceeded by fixing the 
level of Et a t  some value e and then assessing the one attribute 
t 
function u ( e  I E = e ). It appeared that for lot ter ies  involving 1 t t l  t t 
levels of E t t l  that were  higher than et he was r i s k  ave r se  but was 
r i s k  prone for levels  of E t t l  lower than e The reason was that the t ' 
previous yea r ' s  employment level represented a goal o r  aspirat ion 
level for the present  year ,  par t  of his  des i re  for stability in  employment 
levels. The only depar ture  f r o m  this was that if I fixed et a t  anything 
higher than 80% he was never  r i s k  prone for values of e 2 80, because t t l  
any year in which employment was a t  least  80% was "satisfactory". 
Hence his "goal" was min{et, 801 . A typical graph of u l (e t t l  ( E t  = et) 
i s  shown in F igure  13. 
The two piece function was fitted again quite closely by an  
exponential curve of the form 
- e x p t -  0 . 0 3 e  } t t l  e 2min{80,e t}  t t l  
and 
- exp { +  0.03 e } t t l  e 5 min{80,et} t t l  
- 
In a s imilar  way u (e I Ettl  = e ) was assessed ,  exhibiting much 2 t t+ 1 
the same features.  Since Et-  was fixed at 100 there  was a des i re  
to achieve this goal with e but this was tempered by the opposite t 
des i r e  not to exceed e . The resul t  seemed t o  be that Clark p re -  t+ 1 
fe r red  the pattern (100, 80,90, 100) to (100,90, 80, 100); that although 
a drop f rom 100 to 80 was ser ious it was better to suffer that and 
follow i t  with two years  of improvement than be faced with two yea r s  of 
falling employment, even though this was ultimately followed by an 
- 
increase  f rom 80 to 100. The function u ( e  / Ettl = e ) was of the 2 t t+ 1 
form 
- 
- exp { -  . 0 3  et) e 2 min( 80, ettl - 5) t (3. 16a) 
and 
- 
- exp { +  . 03  et)  e 5 min(80, ett l  - 5)  t (3. 16b) 
That the exponential coefficients in (3. 15) and (3. 16) a r e  a l l  shown equal 
to 0. 03 was because they were al l  fa ir ly  close and the implications 
seemed insensitive to this parameter .  
To obtain the combined function u (e  B t7 e t+ l  ) I used the fact that 
and 
uB(et, e t t l )  = Net)  + Wet) ul(et t l  lEt = e t ) 
for  some functions f, g, h, k, and solving these gives 
where a a Z ,  a3 ,  a4 were  constants calculated in much the same 
manner a s  the constants k kZ,  kg ,  k4 were fo r  the recreat ional  
4 0 function, and e t # et was any constant, chosen to be 50. 
Figure 13. Utility Function for Employment, 
Conditional on the Level of 
Emnloyment in the Previous Year. 
Figure 14. Profit/Employment Indifference 
Curves for a Single Year. 
3. 3. 2 The Profi t -  Employment Tradeoffs 
The next step was to calculate u ( p  e ). This could have been A t' t 
done in the same way a s  for  u but Clark found it eas ier  to think in B 
t e r m s  of indifference curves between p t) et  pairs.  Hence on graph 
paper with axes of e f r o m  50 to 100 and of pt  f rom -10 to + 30 we 
t l  1 2 2 located on it pai rs  ( p t ,  e t ) ,  ( P  e t )  between which Clark was in- t '  
different, again bearing in mind that a l l  other attributes were a t  their 
fixed levels, and then fairing in sample indifference curves.  The 
resul t  i s  exhibited in Figure 14. 
Wh.at was delightful to m e  a s  the analyst was that if we describe 
the above indifference curves by the functional relationship 
@ ( p  t, et) = constant 
for  varying constants it was empirically observable that 
for a l l  values of e . This meant that quantification of C$ was easy. I 
used a polynomial curve fitting program on one of the indifference curves,  
finding that a quadratic was sufficiently accurate and by substituting in 
the other curves confirmed directly the visual observation that property 
( 3 .  20) held. 11 
The indifference curves were  
2 $ ( p  , e  ) = et + 1 .9  pt - 0.04 p t  = constant . t t 
The next assessment  task was now to a s s e s s  a utility function over 
, 
the value function. Using the indifference curves,  any pair  ( p  e ) 
>:c * t' t 
could be replaced by an equivalent pair ( p  100) where @ ( p t ,  100) = t '  
l l F o r  aiq example of this property in  connection with t ime s t r eams  s e e  
Bell [1] . 
The one dimensional utility function u ( p  A t' 100) had ea r l i e r  been 
a s s e s s e d  in  the usual manner  in  the range -8  to  + 26, the resul t  
depicted in F igure  15. 
Recal l  that  if Clark has  been consistent we should be able to  
observe that u (0, et)  = uB(et, 100). As a check I calculated the A 
implied function u ( p  100) using uB(et, 100) and @ ( p t , e t ) .  Actually, A t' 
comparison was onlyposs ib le  between -8 5 p t 5  0 but h e r e  the 
agreement  was close. The full  implied function u ( P  100) i s  shown A t' 
i n  F igure  16 for  p c 0. 
Note that because @(-9 .  15, 100) = @(0, 80) the implied function 
u A ( ~ t ,  100) becomes r i s k  prone for pt c - 9. 15. F r o m  a consistency 
check point of view we were  perhaps fortunate that the direct  a s ses smen t  
of uA(Pt, 100) did not involve a range that  low! 
F o r  l a t e r  calculations the value of uA(pt ,  et)  was taken to be 
where 
'# 
@ ( p t ,  100) = @(pt ,  et)  
and 
f o r  @ ( p t ,  et) < 100 
where 
~ ( 0 ,  e r )  = a p t ,  e t )  . 
The functions u and u were  scaled so that  u (0, 100) = u (100, 100) = 0 A B A B 
and u (0, 50) = uB(50, 100) = u (100, 50) = -1. A B 
3. 3. 3 Evaluatine the Constant X 
To complete the a s ses smen t  of u ( p ,  e )  it remained to calculate X ,  S -  - 
the  constant i n  equation (3. 14). What this  constant controls i s  the  degree 
to  which the decision maker  p re fe r s  a mixture  of good yea r s  and bad 
yea r s  to  appear in  bunches o r  in te rspersed .  So I began by asking Clark 
if he had to  a r r ange  50 good years  and 50 bad years  in  a 
sequence of 100, how would he do it ? Recall  that  if we were  not using 
F i g u r e  1 5 .  l d a r g i n a l  U t i l i t y  F u n c t i o n  f o r  a S i n g l e  
Y e a r ' s  P r o f i t s .  
F i g u r e  1 6 .  The M a r g i n a l  U t i l i t y  F u n c t i o n  f o r  
P r o f i t  I m p l i e d  by F i g u r e s  1 3  a n d  1 4 .  
functions with interperiod dependencies such a question would not a r i s e  
since a l l  permutations would be equally prefer red  since Clark i s  
adopting a "no discountingtf policy. He certainly disliked both the 
options in  which good and bad alternated and in which a l l  50 good years  
came together. As 1/A becomes la rger  the tendency i s  for the 
utility function to prefer  smaller  blocks and a s  it becomes smaller  
(and negative) to prefer  the l a rge  bunching. 
I asked Clark to consider the following four s t r eams  of seven 
year employment figures 
(ii) 100, 70, 70, 70, 70, 100, 100 
(iii) 100, 70, 70, 70, 70, 70, 100 
and tel l  me what s ta tements  he could make regarding his preferences 
between them. He established that (i) was the best, (iii) the worst  and 
felt  that ( iv) was preferable  to (ii) "if anything. " 
I drew the following graph (Figure 17) which shows the utility of 
(i) fixed a t  1, the utility of (iii) fixed a t  ze ro  and the corresponding 
utilities of (ii) and (iv) a s  functions of 1/A using ( 3 .  14). Note that 
1/A = 0 corresponds to  the additive case.  
The near  indifference of (ii) and (iv) suggested that l / h  should be 
chosen to be about 1 but there  were other considerations. In order  to  
avoid discontinuities in  uS(p, 2) it must  be the case  that A t u B (e  t y e t t l )  
and A + uA(pt, e t )  a r e  ei ther  always both negative o r  always both 
positive. Lf both positive then 
A 2 max [ -uB(50, 50), -uA(-20, 5011 
i s  a constant and if both negative then 
Clearly it i s  the fo rmer  case  which i s  appropriate here and so A 2 1.487 
o r  1/A 5 .  6735. F r o m  Figure  17 this  means that to be consistent, Clark 
F i g u r e  1 7 .  T h e  R e l a t i v e  U t i l i t i e s  of F o u r  T i m e  S t r e a m s  a s  .i V a r i e s .  
should prefer  (ii) to (iv). He also felt  that he would prefer  (iv) to  a 
50-50 gamble between (i) and (ii i)  which with the existing function 
U~ 
i s  never possible. This discrepancy was not resolved. Clark later  
decided that his  answer to the question of sequencing 50 good and 50 bad 
yea r s  was to do it i n  alternating four year blocks. This answer contra- 
dicts his preference of (iv) over (ii). As the mini-computer I was using 
only allowed up to 10 year t ime s t r eams  I could not experiment with 
graphs such a s  Figure 17 for longer blocks but this should be possible 
la ter .  A value of X = 1. 61 is currently being used. 
3 . 4  The Balance Between Recreation and Social Benefits 
Everything was now reduced to finding the constants kl and k 2 
of formula (3. 6): 
The constant k2 was quickly established to be zero because Clark iel t  
that lotteries of the following type 
high, us low 
1 low, u low 2 R S 2 R S u low, u high 
were indifferent. Actually over the period of the analysis he alternated 
between the following two arguments: 
1) When unemployment i s  high, the people should a t  least  be able 
to spend their enforced f r ee  t ime enjoying the fores t  and when 
business i s  booming, bad recreat ional  facili t ies can be over-  
looked. At leas t  something should be good. 
and 
2) It  i s  probably not the unemployed who do take advantage of 
weekends in the fores t  and i n  any case the forest  a s  a recreat ional  
a r e a  se rves  a f a r  g rea te r  number of people than a r e  
associated with the logging industry. Hence the re  i s  likely 
to be an  outcry i f  people notice high profits in the logging 
business and poor recreation.  
Argument 1)  favours L6 and argument 2) favours L5. He 
finally converged on indifference. Thus k2 = 0. 
Since, i n  some sense,  k now embodies the tradeoff to  be made  1 
between "profits" and "environment" some c a r e  was neces sa ry  in i t s  
calculation. F i r s t  I asked for a profit  level x such that for a single 
year  
where the vectors  a r e  (P Et, Gt, B ) a l l  other periods being assumed t  ' t  
to  be a t  fixed values, and to find a number of good a r e a s  y such that 
His answers  of x = - 3  and y = 6 yielded a f t e r  substitution in (3 .  2 1) 
the values k l  = 7.9 and k l  = 5. 0. To provide fur ther  evidence I 
asked for a number of bad a r e a s  z such that  (0, 100, 15, z) was 
indifferent to (0, 95, 15, 100) and a level of employment w such that  
His answers  h e r e  were  z = 155 and w = 90 giving k l  = 9.4  and 5. 3 
respectively.  
I fe l t  h i s  answer  x was the mos t  reliable and that  of w the 
leas t  reliable (because of the difficult tradeoffs involved) and so 
k = 7. 5 seemed an  appropria te  compromise.  1 
4. A Summary  of the Assumptions 
Let  us review a l l  of the assumptions which were  used concerning 
the decision m a k e r ' s  p re fe rences  over the a t t r ibutes  ( P I ,  E l ,  G1, B1, 
. . . , PT, E T ,  GT, BT)  Recall  that  the mathematical  r e su l t  of 
asser t ing  that  a t t r ibu te (s )  X i s  conditionally utility independent of Y 
when Z i s  fixed i s  that  for any values x, y, z of X, Y,  Z and some 
fixed value yo of Y 
for  some  functions f ,  g. Utility independence i s  the special  c a s e  when 
the s e t  Z i s  empty. 
The assumptions made were:  
(i) The at t r ibutes  { P I ,  E P2, E2,  . . . , PT, E T )  a r e  mutually 
utility independent with { G B G2, B2, . . . , GT, B ~ )  . 
(ii) F o r  each  t = 1, . . . ,  T-2,  the s e t  { P 1 , E 1 , P 2 , E 2  ,..., P t , E t ]  
i s  mutually conditionally utility independent with { P  t+27 E t+2 , -  . . 7 PT, E T )  
(iii) F o r  each  t = 1, . . . , T -  1 ,  P i s  mutually conditionally utility t 
independent with { I? t+ Et+ and Pt+ i s  mutually conditionally 
utility independent with { P , E 3 . t t  
( iv)  F o r  a l l  t  = 1 , .  . . , T-1  , ( G ~ ,  B1,G2, B2 , .  . . , Gt, Bt] i s  
mutually conditionally utility independent with {G t t l ,  Btt 1, 9 GT, BT) 
(v) Fo r  a l l  t = 1 , .  . . , T G i s  mutually conditionally utility t 
independent with B 
t ' 
(vi)  P re fe rences  over t ime  a r e  stationary,  that  i s ,  ignoring end 
effects, if the t ime  index in  any situation were  a l te red  by an equal 
constant amount for  a l l  outcomes,  re la t ive  preferences  would be 
unaffected. 
These  assumptions need not be this  strong to  imply the r e su l t s  
used but since (3. 14) and (3. 21) together imply a l l  of the  above it s e e m s  
worthwhile t o  s ta te  t hem in full.  
5. Thoughts on the Whole Procedure 
The motivation of this study gradually shifted in emphasis f rom a 
casual curiousness by me into the profit/environmental tradeoffs of the 
IIASA Ecology group, to an eagerness by that group to obtain an 
objective function with which to evaluate policies and finally to a 
searching examination by Clark of the ability of "decision analysis I '  to 
handle complex problems. 
It  could be that liitle more  wi l l  be gained in t e r m s  of establishing 
better management policies using the complex objective function 
assessed  he re  then if the original l inear function were maintained. But 
if the poiicy evaluations a r e  different then this study will have achieved 
a great deal for then attention can be focussed on the reasons for the 
differences and the implications hopefully resolved. 
The Ecology project members  have benefited f rom this study by 
having to discuss in concrete t e r m s  (seemingly for  the f i r s t  t ime) about 
their precise objectives of "what they want out of their forest.  ' I  It i s  
quite remarkable how a group who on the face  of i t  agree "in principle" 
can differ diametrically when i t  comes to  quantification. I 
I I began this study a s  an advocate of decision analysis a s  a means 
of raising important i ssues  in  a decision context, but a s  a skeptic wher- 
i t  came to i t s  ability to deal with anything more  complicated than the 
handling of minor monetary decisions with uncertain payoffs, and my  
own interest  was to see  what I could do with the theory in a "real" 
situation. I a m  encouraged. With more  practice a lot of the e r r o r s  
and lack of sophistication can be eliminated in future studies. For  
exampie I would concentrate much more  on extracting information f r o m  
thz decision maker  about which he was su re  at  an early stage. After a 
long period of questioning, decision making seems to get harder  for the 
decision maker rather  than eas ier .  I would be inclined to keep questions 
which involve uncertainty down to a minimum a s  a good feel for 
probability is. ra ther  r a r e - - m y  decision maker flatly refused to discuss 
any lottery which wasn't a case of an equal probability for each consequence. 
In theory it i s  possible to fir s t  evaluate a value function over al l  the 
attributes and then a s s e s s  a single one attribute utility over that value 
function, but that i s  a little extreme a s  it loses  a lot of the s t ructure 
offered by the utility independence concepts. 
I was initially skeptical a lso about the extent to which simplifying 
assumptions were  "natural" a s  opposed to being forced on an unwilling 
decision maker  a s  a mat te r  of expediency. It certainly appears  that 
often such assumptions a r e  empirically observable or  a r e  sufficiently 
closely approximated that l i t t le accuracy i s  lost. After a l l ,  much of 
the weighting between different outcomes s t ems  f r o m  the major  
constants such a s  kl and k2 in ( 3 .  21) and X in ( 3 .  14) ra ther  than, 
say, the particular choice of coefficient for  the exponential curve fitted to  
u&). 
On a pract ical  mat te r ,  a s  this study was completed on a part  t ime 
on-off fashion over 18 months it was inevitable that the decision m a k e r f s  
preferences gradually a l te red  over this  t ime; adding to this my own 
frequent numerical  and programming e r r o r s ,  meant that I was often 
forced to  s t a r t  f r o m  the beginning and rework most  of the calculat' ~ o n s .  
It was only towards the very end of this study that I learned to  ssve the 
For t r an  programs which performed many of these calculations. As a 
resul t ,  a lot of the ea r ly  assessments  were not rewo rked or  subjected 
to a sensitivity analysis.  A golden rule for those undertaking any major  
assessment  which i s  l ikely to  involve complex tradeoffs i s  to program 
everything! 
6. Postscr ip t  
A monograph summarizing the "Budworm Project ,  ' '  of which this 
paper descr ibes  a part ,  should be available within a few months with 
contributions f r o m  those of us who have worked on i t  a t  the Institute of 
Resource Analysis of the University of Bri t ish Columbia, the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria and the 
Environmental Systems P r o g r a m  a t  Harvard University. That should 
include comparisons of policy options using the l inear objective function, 
the value function and the utility function mentioned here,  a s  well a s  a 
range of other s t rategic  objectives. As with any multi-person project, 
the work described in this paper owes a lot to others ,  in  particular to 
Bill Clark with whom I spent many hours, not only on mat ters  of 
specific assessment  but also in discussing ways to make decision 
analysis more  applicable to ecological problems and in  philosophizing 
on the "time problem, ' '  the question .of how to a s s e s s  preferences over 
time. Professor  Holling, t h e  leader of the Ecology Project ,  spent 
days clarifying questions on the model and making (endless) l i s t s  of 
possible indicators for our,  then a s  yet unnamed, decision maker  to  
study. I a m  grateful to George Dantzig for  his encouragement and 
meticulous reading of an ear l ie r  draf t  of this paper and to Ralph Keeney 
both for introducing me  to the subject of decision analysis and for the 
many stimulating discussions that we have had on this project and 
other topics since. 
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